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STATUTES AND RULES
Statutes
Section 34-35-7.1 Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim Investigations
- Adjudicative
proceedings
Settlement
Reconsideration - Determination.
(1) (a)
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself,
his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file with the
commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under
oath or affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall
be filed within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship
committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who
refuse or threaten to refuse to comply with the provisions of this
chapter may file with the commission a request for agency action
asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by
conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a)
Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an
investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by
conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make
a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in the
request for agency action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall
conduct every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies
involved, and may not attempt a settlement between the parties if
it is clear that no discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice has occurred.
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(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for
agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final
order.
(4) (a)
If the initial attempts at settlement are
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence
during his investigation to support the allegations of a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out in the
request for cigency action, the investigator shall formally report
these findincjs to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director
may issue ci determination and order for dismissal of the
adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination
and order within 30 days of the date of the determination and order
for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing,
the determination and order issued by the director becomes the
final order of the commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful
and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his
investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice set out in the request for agency
action, the investigator shall formally report these findings to
the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director
may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's
report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination
and order within 30 days of the date of the determination and
order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing,
the determination and order issued by the director requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the
final order of the commission.
(6)
In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing except as
a witness, nor may he participate in the deliberations of the
presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party
filing the request for agency action may reasonably and fairly
amend any allegation, and the respondent may amend its answer.
Those amendments may be made during or after a hearing but only
with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding
officer finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory
or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall
issue an order dismissing the request for agency action containing
the allegation of a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice.
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(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be
reimbursed by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and
costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding
officer finds that a respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue
an order requiring the respondent to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to the
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits,
and attorneys' fees and costs.
(10)
Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of
the order issued by the presiding officer in accordance with
Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued
by the presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) is
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16.
(13)
The commission shall have authority to make rules
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(14)
The members of the commission and its staff may not
divulge or make public any
information gained
from any
investigation, settlement negotiation, or proceeding before the
commission except in the following:
(a) Information used by the director in making any
determination may be provided to all interested parties for the
purpose of preparation for and participation in proceedings before
the commission.
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided
the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed.
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the
attorney general or other legal representatives of the state or
commission.
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and
reporting requirements of the federal government.
(15)
The procedures contained in this section are the
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination
based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or
handicap.
(16)
The commencement of an action under federal law for
relief based upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the
commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding before
the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in connection with the same
claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection is intended
to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision
set forth in Subsection (15).
Section 63-46b-l

Scope and applicability of chapter.
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(1)
Except as set forth in Subsection (2) , and except as
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this
chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions of
this chapter apply to every agency of the state of Utah and govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or
more identifiable persons, including all agency actions to grant,
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an
authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of all such actions.
(2) The provisions of this chapter do not govern:
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency rules, or the
judicial review of those procedures or rules;
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment
of a tax, the decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the
imposition of, and penalties or interest on, taxes, or the issuance
of any tax assessment, except that the provisions of this chapter
govern any agency action commenced by a taxpayer or by another
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of
those actions;
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the
granting of pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of
sentences, or to the rescission, termination, or revocation of
parole or probation, to actions and decisions of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board relating to discharge, conditional release,
or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the discipline
of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or
the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility,
the Utah State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or
persons in the custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental
Health, or persons on probation or parole, or judicial review of
those actions;
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ,
transfer, reassign, or promote students or teachers in any school
or educational institution, or judicial review of those actions;
(e) applications for employment and internal personnel
actions within an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial
review of those actions;
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Title
35, Chapter 9, Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, and
Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act,
except that the provisions of this chapter govern any agency action
commenced by the employer, licensee, or other person authorized by
law to contest the validity or correctness of such a citation or
assessment;
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state
funds, and contracts for the purchase or sale of products, real
property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the state# or by
or for an agency of the state, except as provided in such
contracts, or judicial review of those actions;
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3,
Powers and Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and
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Title 7, Chapter 2, Possession of Depository Institution by
Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan Corporation
Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19, Acquisition of Failing
Depository Institutions or Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter
30, Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review of those actions;
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for
unemployment benefits, the initial determination of any person's
eligibility for benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Worker's
Compensation, and Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease
Disability Law, or the initial determination of a person's
unemployment tax liability;
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or
award of monetary grants to or between governmental units, or for
research, development, or the arts, or judicial review of those
actions;
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under
Title 26, Chapter 8, Utah Emergency Medical Services System Act,
Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe
Drinking Water Act, Title 19, Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act, or
Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, except
that the provisions of this chapter govern any agency action
commenced by any person authorized by law to contest the validity
or correctness of any such notice or order;
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal
statute or regulation to be conducted according to federal
procedures;
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for
government or public assistance benefits;
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses,
permits, tags, and certificates of registration;
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act, except as provided in
Section 63-2-603.
(3) The provisions of this chapter do not affect any legal
remedies otherwise available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the
beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer
during an adjudicative proceeding from:
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and
interested persons to:
(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(iii) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceedings; or
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment if the requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56,
respectively, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the
moving party, except to the extent that the requirements of those
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rules are modified by this chapter.
(5) (a)
Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section
63-4 6b-21 are not governed by this chapter, except as explicitly
provided in that section,
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by
Section 63-4 6b-21 are governed by this chapter.
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting
rules affecting or governing adjudicative proceedings or from
following any of those rules, if the rules are enacted according to
the procedures
outlined
in Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the
requirements of this chapter.
(7) If the attorney general issues a written determination
that any provision of this chapter would result in the denial of
funds or services to an agency of the state from the federal
government, the applicability of those provisions to that agency
shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the denial.
The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature
at its next session.
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an
independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action.
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from lengthening or
shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
Section 63-46b-12

Agency review - Procedure.

(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to
any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the
agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a
written request for review within 30 days after the issuance of the
order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the
statute or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each
party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for
review, or within the time period provided by agency rule,
whichever is longer, any party may file a response with the person
designated by statute or rule to receive the response. One copy of
the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and to
the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency7s rules require review of an
order by the agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior
agency shall review the order within a reasonable time or within
the time required by statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by
order or rule permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or
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to c o n d u c t o r a 1 a r g u m e n t . •
(5)
Notice of hearings < review shall be mailed to all
parties.
(6) (a)
Within a reasonable time after the filing of any
response, other filings, or oral argument, or within the time
required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior
agency shall issue a written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or
by a person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be
mailed to each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i ) a d e s i g n a t i o n of t h e statute or ru] e p e r m i t t i n g or
requiring review;
(ii) a s t a t e m e n t of t h e issues r e v i e w e d ;
(iii) f i n d i n g s of fact a s t o each of t h e issues r e v i e w e d ;
(iv) c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w a s t o each o f t h e issues r e v i e w e d ;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or
any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(viI) a notice of any right of further administrative
reconsideration or judicial review avai1ab]e to aggrieved parties;
and
(vi ii) tl le time limits applicable t<« any appeal or review.
Sectioi i 63 4 6b-jl .3

Agei )

••

•.,:**•.

(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued
for which review by the agency or by a superior agency under
Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise
constitute final agency action, any party may file a written
request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific
grounds upon which relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the
request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the
order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the
agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the
person making the request.
(3) (a)
The agency head, or a person designated for that
purpose, shall issue a written order granting the request or
denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that
purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of
the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to
be denied
Section 63 46b-3 I Judicial review
Exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly
prohibited by statute.
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(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states
that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the* court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable
harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion,
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of
final agency action within 3 0 days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to
have been issued under Subsection 63~46b-13(3) (b) .
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form
requirements specified in this chapter.
Section 63-46b-16
Judicial review - Formal
adjudicative
proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a)
To seek judicial review of final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate
rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court
shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the
appellate court.
(3)
The* contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency 7 s
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are
governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing
transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate
to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the
following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by
any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
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resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously i nterpreted or a/j: »pJ i ed the
law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the coi-(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency
statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency , s prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Section 63-46b-18
Judicial review - Stay and other temporary
remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant
a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency
of judicial review, according to the agency 7 s rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other
temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require
immediate judicial intervention.
(3)
If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary
remedies requested by a party, the agency's order of denial shall
be mailed to all parties and shall specify the reasons why the stay
or other temporary remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy
to protect the public health, safety, or welfare against a
substantial threat, the court may not grant a stay or other
temporary remedy unless it finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail
on the merits when the court finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will s= ~i
irreparable injury without immediate relief;
(:i i i) granting relief to the party seeking review will not
substantially harm other parties to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare
relied upon by the agency is not sufficiently serious to justify
the agency's action under the circumstances.
Rules

R560-1-5
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n oi
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Procedures Act.

Pi. oi/ieoci i iitj
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The
adjudicative
proceeding
referred
to
in
Section
34-35-7.1(6) -(10) , U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative hearing which
shall occur following the investigation process referred to in
Section 34-35-7.1(1)-(5), U.C.A. The formal hearing shall be held
after the Director sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to
the Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the requirements imposed by
Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been satisfied and that a formal
hearing is necessary to finally resolve the matter and when it is
appropriate pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A.
R568-1-5 Allowance for Mailing.
A. Whenever a notice or other paper requiring or permitting some
action on behalf of a party is served on a party by mail, three
days shall be added to the prescribed period as allowed under Rule
6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This three day extension
does not apply to notices sent by registered mail as required by
Sections 35-1-46(3) and 35-1-46.30(2), U.C.A.
URAP 3 Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may
be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the
appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final
orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within
the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as
well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are
entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are
such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice
of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a
single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be
consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or
upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be
known as the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The
title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the
appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court,
the party mciking the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate
the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the
court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal
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shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each
party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented
by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address,
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of
filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil
case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the
trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also
the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. The clerk
of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal un]ess the
filing and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing :>f appeal. Upon the fil i ng of the noti ce of appeal
and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court
shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal,
showing the date of its filing, together with the docketing fee., to
the.clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court,
with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not
contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the
title.
URAP I Appeal a:s of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to
the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall
be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when
a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any
party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not ai i
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is
granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4)
under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties
shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely
motion under the -Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the
trial court by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2)
under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial
or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shdll have
no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial
court disposing of the motion as provided above.
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(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as
provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed
after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal
within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal
was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a)
of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing
of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing
a notice of cippeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after
the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may
be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of
the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
URAP 8 Stay or injunction pending appeal.
(a) Stay must ordinarily be sought in the first instance in trial
court; motion for stay in appellate court. Application for a stay
of the judgment or order of a trial court pending appeal, or
disposition of a petition under Rule 5, or for approval of a
supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring,
or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must
ordinarily be made in the first instance in the trial court• A
motion for such relief may be made to the appellate court, but the
motion shall show that application to the trial court for the
relief sought is not practicable, or that the trial court has
denied an application, or has failed to afford the relief which the
applicant requested, with the reasons given by the trial court for
its action. The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief
requested and the facts relied upon, and if the facts are subject
to dispute, the motion shall be supported by affidavits or other
sworn statements or copies thereof. With the motion shall be filed
such parts of the record as are relevant. Reasonable notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties. The motion shall be filed
with the clerk and normally will be considered by the court, but in
exceptional cases where such procedure would be impracticable due
to the requirements of time, the application may be considered by
a single justice or judge of the court.
(b) Stay may be conditioned upon giving of bond. Relief available
in the appellate court under this rule may be conditioned upon the
filing of a bond or other appropriate security in the trial.court.
(c) Stays in criminal cases. Stays in criminal cases "pending
appeal are governed by Rule 27, U.R.Crim.P.
URAP 24

Briefs.
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(a) Brief -of. -the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed,
except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names
of all such parties- The list should be set 01it on a separate page
which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged
and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities
cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited
(4) A brief • .t <i t om< iit showinq I hij jurisdiction ol 1 liu
appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the
standard of appellate review for each issue with supporting
authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and
in that event, the provision shall be set forth as provided in
paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings,
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record (see paragraph (e)).
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments
actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere
repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except
that a statement of the issues or of the case need not be made
unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the
appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the
brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the
appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing
brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave "of the
appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in
their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to
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parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee". It
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,"
"the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made
to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits
shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules, regulations,
documents, etc.
(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision, findings of fact,
conclusions of law, or order pertaining to the issues on appeal and
any jury instructions or other part of the record of central
importance to the determination of the appeal shall be reproduced
in the brief or in an addendum to the brief.
(2) If determination of the issues presented requires the
study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts
thereof, to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of
this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum
at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form.
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court,
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes,
rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (f) of this rule.
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is
filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed
the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the
parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of
the appellee shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the
cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees.
In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, including
cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either
may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt
by reference* any part of the brief of another. Parties may
similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and
significant authorities come to the attention of a party after that
party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original" letter
and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals.
There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a
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point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter
shall without argument state the reasons for the supplemental
citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and
shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must
be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and
the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27.
URCP 5 Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these
rules, every order required by its terms to be served, every
pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court
otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper
relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the
court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance,
demand, offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment
under Rule 58A(d), and similar paper shall be served upon each of
the parties. No service need be made on parties in default for
failure to appear except as provided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default
proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims for
relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner
provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through
arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no
person need be or is named as defendant, any service required to be
made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be
made upon the person having custody or possession of the property
at the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: How made.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the
service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or
upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by
mailing it to him at his known address or, if no address is known,
by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a copy
within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party;
or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in
charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a
conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is closed or the
person to be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon
mailing.
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers
may be Served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any

17
foreign attorney practicing in any of the courts of this state.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there
are unusually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion
or of its own initiative, may order that service of the pleadings
of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between
the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein
shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other parties and
that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties* A copy of
every such order shall be served upon the parties in such manner
and form as the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served
upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or
within a reasonable time thereafter, but the court may upon motion
of a party or on its own initiative order that depositions,
interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission,
and answers cind responses thereto not be filed unless on order of
the court or for use in the proceeding.
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and
other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be
made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the
judge may permit the papers to be filed with him, in which event he
shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to
the office of the clerk, if any.
URCP 6 Time,.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any district court,
by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the
act, event, or default from which the designated period of time
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of
the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday.
When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be
excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given
thereunder or by order of the court an act is required or allowed
to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown
may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or
notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of
the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to
act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and
(e) , 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided
for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not
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affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of a
term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of
court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act or take
any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before
it.
(d) For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or
by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on
ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the
affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise
provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be
served at some other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has
the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings
within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him b y mail,
3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) concurs with
Maverik Country Stores, Inc. that if its appeals and motions for
review

were

timely

statutes cited.
relate

to

filed

that

jurisdiction

exists

under

the

Rules 3 and 4 (Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure)

trial

courts,

and

therefore

do

not

seem

to

be

relate

to

appropriate.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
Maverik
jurisdiction

has
of

stated
the

four

issues

Commission,

which

largely

exhaustion

remedies, and finality of its orders.

of

administrative

The Commission will restate

them.
I.

Was the June 26, 1991 order of the administrative law

judge (ALJ) a final order allowing Maverik to appeal to this Court
without

requesting

review

of

the

ALJ's

order

by

the

full
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Commission, and even though some matters had been reserved for
further briefing and resolution by the ALJ?

This is an issue of

law requiring a correction of error standard.

Cross v. Ind. Comm'n

et al. f 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. Jan. 29, 1992).
II.

Assuming

the

Commission

had

jurisdiction,

"filing" of a request for review complete upon mailing?
issue of law requiring a correction of error standard.
III.

Assuming

that the Commission had

mailing the request was
abused

its discretion

extension

to

file

was

the

This is an
Id.

jurisdiction,

that

insufficient, and that the Commission

in failing to grant a one business day

Maverik's

request

for

review,

did

the

Commissions action in reviewing all of Maverik's claims render
this error hcirmless?

The Commission concurs with Maverik that the

Commission should be deferred to unless it abused its discretion.
Nucor Corp. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah
Sup. Ct. May 18, 1992).
IV. Were any of the subsequent orders of the Commission final
within the meaning of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-14
1988)?

(1953 as amended

This is an issue of law requiring a correction of error

standard.

Cross, supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. The first case of the cases consolidated for this argument
involve a situation where the Petitioner/Appellant Maverik Country
Stores, Incorporated (Maverik) appealed to this Court on July 26,
1991 while the case had not been completed, matters were still
pending before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Commission,
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and before Maverik had exhausted its administrative remedies within
the Commission,
review

on

The second case involves Maverik's request for

October

10,

1991,

and

its

two

requests

for

reconsideration which were filed on March 19, 1992, and April 6,
1992, respectively.
b.

This case involves a claim of discrimination based on

handicapped

status

brought

by

Vicki

Ann

respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik).

McCord

against

the

The charge was filed

with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24,
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment.

The UADD confirmed

the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24,
1991.

Respondent requested a formal hearing before an ALJ, and the

request was granted.

As a result of the hearing, Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and an Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26,
1991.

Appendix A.

On

September

10, 1991 the ALJ

supplemental order dealing with attorney fees.

issued a

Appendix B.

On

October 11, 1991, the respondent requested review by the Industrial
Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and September 10,
1991.

Appendix C.
On

October

25,

1991,

Ms. McCord

filed

a

Memorandum

in

Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion
for Review with the Commission in connection with the June 26, 1991
Order, and could not therefore contest its provisions.
The relevant facts are as follows.

Ms. McCord was hired as a
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clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. TR. 38,
54.

She was interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store

manager.

Ms. McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per

week

$3.35

at

employment.

per

hour

during

her

TR. 54-55; Exhibit A-17.

two

weeks

of

part-time

She performed cashiering,

bookkeeping, customer service, and stocking shelves.

TR. 56.

She had answered "no" to respondent's employment application
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are
applying?"

TR. 34. However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a

heart condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while living in
California in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and
a racing heartbeat.
had

informed

her

TR. 31-32.
that

lifestyle or employment.

the

Ms. McCord related that her doctor

condition

TR. 34.

required

no

changes

in

She was prescribed a "beta

blocker," and she had no further difficulties.

TR. 35-38.

Both peirties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...*"

TR.

5; R. 30.
Dr. Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems
in regard to her working at her job."

Exhibits A-ll, A-7, TR. 103-

108.
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some
tightness in her chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable.

TR.

22
64-66.

She asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the

hospital to get her heart checked.

TR. 67.

Ms. McCord disclosed

her mitral valve prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to
questions.

TR. 67.

While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms.
McCord's application for employment.
noted by Ms. McCord.

No heart condition had been

The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms.

McCord 7 s heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change
of beta blocker.

TR. 70-71.

Although Ms. McCord called about two

hours later, and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told
to stay home and rest.

TR. 72.

It is not clear where the termination of employment took
place.

There is some dispute about whether the termination took

place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same
day as the hospital episode.

TR. 145-146.

During several of the

discussions between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on
that day, Ms. Jones stated that her mother had died from heart
problems, and her son had recently had open heart surgery.

During

the termination discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the
seriousness of Ms. McCord's heart problems.

TR. 73.

Ms. Jones

then asked Ms. McCord why she did not disclose the heart condition
on her application.

Ms. McCord replied that she believed that it

presented no restrictions on her, and that she did not consider it
to be life threatening.

TR. 74-75.

Ms. Jones responded that she

(Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave Ms. McCord in the store alone.
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TR. 79.

she then terminated Ms. McCord's employment. TR. 82.

A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms.
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination
in a typewritten attachment.

R. 11.

Exhibit A-4.

This form and

attachment show that Ms. Jones was greatly concerned about Ms.
McCord's heart problem, and the potential that Ms. McCord would
have another

medical

episode under the stress created

continued employment at Maverik.
her

it would be best

employment."

if she

if she

Ms. Jones wrote that "I then told
looked

for other

less stressful

Id.

Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress
on th§ job and do her job accurately...."

R. 12-14; Exhibit A-5.

Again, it appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress
factor.
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were
discussed:

1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump

meters; TR. 231.

and, 2) allegations that customers and employees

had complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord / s breath during
work.

TR. 281, 285.

Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before

working (TR. 154), and an employee testified that Ms. McCord's cash
register till was accurate. TR. 231. Significantly, none of these
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or
were written on the termination form or attachment.
162-163; Exhibit A-4.

TR. 90-95,
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There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord.

TR. 186.

Ms. McCord testified that she had sought to find work at
"ninety to a hundred11 entities and places (TR. 110) , and introduced
evidence

that

after

her

termination

she

attempted

employment at 26 employment locations during 1989-1991.
Exhibit A-8.

to

find

R. 27;

She worked for a short time as a janitor at an

elementary school from November 1988 through January 1989. TR. 114.
Although there was some testimony that Maverik employees had made
unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord to other persons in the
Vernal area (TR. 122-123), the ALJ found no direct evidence that
Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms. McCord / s
ability to seek other employment. R. 135; Appendix A, at 5.
The ALJ then concluded

as a matter of

law that

"Maverik

Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under
Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord." R. 136; Appendix A, at
6.

The ALJ based this conclusion on Maverik / s perception of Ms.

McCord as handicapped. R. 136.
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did
'substantially limit major life activities only as a
result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment. ...'
R. 136; Order, ALJ at 6 (June 26, 1991), citations omitted.
The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her
conclusions of law that Ms. McCord was otherwise qualified to
perform the work. R. 137; Appendix A, at 6.
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The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores:
1.

Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited employment

practice in the nature of handicap discrimination.
2.

An

order

to Maverik

to cease

any

discriminatory

or

prohibited employment practices.
3.

Full relief to Ms. McCord

including reinstatement to

employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with
full rights, privileges and protections of employment.
4.

Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for 24

hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date of
termination

through

June

26,

1991

with

increases

in

pay

commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to
$4.25 per hour, subject to all

lawful offsets due to

interim

employment.
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action as may
be

necessary

to

eliminate

and

keep

from

its

environment

any

employment discrimination prohibited by law.
6.

No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for having

exercised her right to file this action.
7.

Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to

counsel for Ms. McCord.
8.

Maverik was to take any other applicable and reasonable

relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her rightful
position.
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9.

And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of the

foregoing shall be filed in writing within 3 0 days of June 26,
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections,
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or
appeal unless such a filing were made. R. 139-140; Appendix A, at
9-10.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I
Maverik should not be allowed to petition this Court in Docket
Number 910413-CA because at the time of the petition the order of
the ALJ dated June 26, 1991 was not final and Maverik had not
exhausted its administrative remedies within the Commission.
II
Maverik claims that the orders of the Commission issued after
Maverik had filed its petition in Docket Number 910413-CA were not
valid. Maverik never asked for a stay of proceedings or for a stay
of

the

Commission's

order.

Maverik

continued

to

complete

discovery, file motions and requests for reconsideration, and to
otherwise use the administrative process.

The doctrine of waiver

may be invoked against Maverik.
Ill
Although Maverik claims that the Commission has created a
"convoluted mess/1 Maverik certainly does not have clean hands in
these two cases.

Maverik raised a number of claims in this

argument without specifying support in the record for them. These
claims should therefore be dismissed.
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IV
Maverik claims that it was required to mail its filing to the
Commission, and that it was allowed an additional three days for
mailing.

Mailing is allowed by the Commission, but documents not

received within the required time are not considered filed within
the meaning of that term,
V
Maverik claims that the Commission abused its discretion in
not granting it a one day extension in which to file a request for
review.

The Commission nevertheless considered all of Maverik's

claims.

Maverik did not raise any good cause defense in its next

request for reconsideration even though the Commission informed it
that

good

cause was

authorized

as

a defense to

late

filing.

Maverik finally raised this defense in its "Limited Request for
Reconsideration" which was denied as a matter of law under U.C.A.
Section 63-46b-13(3)(b)(1953 as amended'1988).
VI
Maverik
McCord.

claims that

The ALJ

clearly

it

cannot

spelled

determine
out

damages owed

the damages which

to

were

relatively simple, i.e. providing only for back pay, attorneys'
fees and costs along with other injunctive relief allowed to be
imposed by the Commission.

Although Maverik alleges that it cannot

even compute the damages to make an estimate, Maverik was able to
claim before* the ALJ that the attorneys' fees were vastly in excess
of McCord's damages which it estimated to be in the range of
$8,000.
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VII
Maverik claims that it has been deprived of its due process
rights under the Utah Constitution, but has shown no prejudice
other than vague claims.

This is insufficient to show a denial of

due process.
ARGUMENTS
The following issues are responses to those framed by Maverik.
This Court should note that Maverik has raised more issues and some
different issues that those which it framed in the issue section.
I
THE COMMISSION DID NOT LOSE JURISDICTION TO ACT
IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ORDER OF JUNE 26, 1991
WAS NOT FINAL AND BECAUSE MAVERIK DID NOT EXHAUST
ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PRIOR TO APPEALING TO THIS COURT
This Court should dismiss the Maverik 7 s Petition for Review
dated July 26, 1991 since the ALJ's order of June 26, 1991 was not
final within the requirements of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-14(1)(1953
as amended 1988), and based on Maverik's failure to exhaust its
administrative remedies in accordance with Section 14(2) of the
same statute.
This Court has recently spoken concerning the requirements for
finality in the order of the agency involved.
In Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463
(Utah App. 1989) (per curiam), the court
concluded that 'an order of [an] agency is
not final so long as it reserves something
for the agency for further decision.' Id.
at 464 ... The argument does not have merit.
Petitioner confuses the requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies with the requirement for finality. The order in Heinecke revoking
petitioner's license was clearly final because it
reflected the determination on all issues before
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the agency, and the issue before this court was
whether all levels of agency review were complete
at the time judicial review was sought. In contrast, as noted in Sloan, the requirement of finality contemplates that the agency proceedings
have been brought to their conclusion by disposition of all issues before the agency. The denial
of a motion to dismiss allows the proceeding to
continue in the agency and is not a final order for
purposes of judicial review.
Barney v. Piv. of Occ. & Pro. Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah
App. 1992).
It was clear to Maverik that there were other issues
which remained unresolved when the ALJ issued her first order on
June 26, 1991.

R. 312-313.

Both Maverik and the adverse party

Vicky McCord reserved the question of appropriate attorney/s fees,
and agreed to address that issue in supplemental briefs to the
Commission.

Order, ALJ

(June 26, 1991) at 9.

In addition,

McCord's counsel was ordered by the ALJ to "submit his brief on
attorney's fees on or before twenty days from the date of this
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response brief, if any, ...
on or before twenty days thereafter."

Id. at 10.

This certainly

shows no finality since there was a significant issue remaining for
resolution.
With regard to exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
Commission respectfully requests this Court to revisit its decision
in Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991).
Heinecke determined that the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
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in the agency's statutes requiring a party to request review where
such review :

a /ailable.
oil Hi-Country is not required

language
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Hi-Country requiring the plain language

Administrative Procedures Act (hereafter Act) to
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pertinent language iroin the Act states:
•••[A] party may seek judicial review only
after exhausting all administrative remedies .'available ....
U,. C , A , Section *">3 4 6 b-1 'I ( ? ) (1 953 as amended 1988) (emphasis added).
The current law also provides that:
If a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to
seek review of an order by the agency •
the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 30 days after the
issuance of the order with the person or
entity designated for that purpose by the
statute or rule.
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U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(1)(a)(1953 as amended 1988).
Both of these two sections are substantially unchanged from
the versions relied upon by the Utah Supreme Court.

There is no

reason for this Court to conclude from Hi-Country that U.C.A.
Sections 63-46b-12(1)(a) and 14(2) cannot be read together to
require Maverik to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to
filing a judicial appeal.
There

is no

language

in the

organic

statutes

Commission which provide that exhaustion is not required.

for the
In the

absence of such language, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required.

U.C.A. Section 63-46b-14(2)(a)•

There is absolutely no language in the ALJ's order which can
be construed to state that Maverik is entitled to judicial review
and that the order is a final order. In fact, the order shows that
it is an order which was subject to becoming final and "not subject
to review or appeal" only if Maverik did not exercise its right to
request a Motion for Review by the Commission.

R. 140.

Maverik

mistakenly or intentionally filed its request with this Court in
violation

of

the

requirements

of

U.C.A.

Section

63-46b-

12(1)(a)(1953 as amended 1988) which allowed review by the full
Commission.
The rules promulgated by the Commission clearly state that
orders "are not final Commission Orders ... until the Order is
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remedies fay filing for a Motion for Review to the full Commission
under

Section 63-46b-12 (1951 as amended 19HH)..
reasons, this Court should therefore dismiss

the appeal in Docket Number 910413-CA,
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II
THE COMMISSIONS POWER TO ENTER
ORDERS IN THIS CASE WERE NOT
TERMINATED DUE TO LACK OF FINALITY,
FAILURE OF MAVERIK TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES, AND MAVERIK'S FAILURE TO ASK
FOR A STAY OR OTHER TEMPORARY REMEDY
PENDING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Maverik alleges that it "chose to appeal, and the Commission's
power to enter to (sic) orders or reconsider terminated."

The

Commission will not rehash the lack of finality or exhaustion of
administrative remedies arguments which it made in Argument I. The
Commission will merely refer this Court to that Argument.
Maverik argues that when the "issues in a main judgment are
appealed, "the district court is indeed without jurisdiction as to
them." It then cited Peters v. Peters, 394 P.2d 71, 73 (Utah 1964)
as support for this argument. The Commission would point out that
there was no question that the district court# s order in Peters was
final.

Of course, since the forum in Peters was a district court

there was no requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted
prior to appeal.
The administrative agency is not equivalent to the district
court, and, for example, because the Commission is involved in
matters to protect the public health, safety, or welfare, the Act
limits a Court's authority to issue a stay where the agency has
declined to do so.

This case does not appear to involve a
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Maverik Brief at «i • li i acid i ti oi i, Mavei i k requested *~ •.- Commission
to review the ALJ's June 26, 1991 order as well as her supplemental
order of September 10, 1 991

Id
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1992.

Id. at 5.
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should not now be allowed to complain that the Commission had no
authority to entertain its motions and requests.
It can be argued that Maverik has waived its right to argue
that the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear its motions and
requests for reconsideration based on the doctrine of waiver.
Waiver is 'the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known
right.' Id.; see Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d
1069, 1073 (Utah 1991); B.R. Woodward v. Collins Food Serv., 754
P.2d 99, 101 (Utah App. 1988). To waive a right, there must be an
existing right, knowledge of its existence, and an intent to
relinquish it.

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983);

B.R. Woodward, supra. at 101. The intent to relinquish a right can
be implied from conduct, if the party's conduct 'unequivocally
evinces an intent to waive or [is] at least . . . inconsistent with
any other intent.' Id.

See Hunter, supra. at 432.

For these reasons, the petitions of Maverik should be denied.
Ill
MAVERIK HAS CREATED THE DILEMMA
IN WHICH IT FINDS ITSELF BY NOT
PROPERLY FOLLOWING THE STATUTES
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Maverik alleges that the Commission "has created a convoluted
mess."

Mctverik Brief at 12.

The Commission assumes that a

"convoluted mess" is much worse that a "mess."

The Commission

agrees that the posture of these cases are troublesome, but that
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asserts. The following Maverik claims on page 13 - 14 of its brief
will be discussed.
"[F]irst argued that no Request for Review by that
agency was timely filed, refusing to consider that which was filed,
even

though

the

jurisdictional."

time

limit

for

Maverik Brief at 13.

such

a

request

is

not

Several of its claims are

related to this issue.
The gravamen of this claim appears to be that
Requests for Review can be filed at any time, and that the
Commission has no rules, statutes, or caselaw which would prevent
it from reviewing the request.

U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as

amended 1988) sets forth some requirements for filing which are
jurisdictional, and can only be avoided upon good cause shown.
U.C.A. Section 63-46b-l(9) (1953 as amended 1988).
The first request for review of the June 26, 1991
order was made by Maverik on October 11, 1991 which was outside the
30 day requirement of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12, supra. R. 310-319;
Appendix C.

Although the Commission determined initially that

Maverik's filing was untimely as to the June 26, 1991 order, the
Commission did consider and respond to all of Maverik's contentions
which Maverik raised in its October 10, 1991 request. Appendix D
& F.

Therefore, if the Commission did commit error as to whether

the October 11, 1991 request for review was timely, it was
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For these reasons the appeals ui Maverik should be dismissed.

THE REQUEST FOR REVIEW WAS
UNTIMELY FILED, BUT IF THIS
HONORABLE COURT FINDS THAT THE
REQUEST FOR REVIEW WAS TIMELY
FILED, THE COMMISSION HAS
CONSIDERED ALL OF MAVERIK'S
CONTENTIONS, AND THIS ALLEGED ERROR
IS HARMLESS
If this Court determines that Maverik could legally file its
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appeal of the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 to this Court without
requesting review by the full Commission then this issue is not
relevant.

However, the Commission believes that this issue should

be resolved cigainst Maverik.
U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(1)(a)(1953 as amended 1988) requires
that parties request review "within 30 days after the issuance of
the

order

purpose. ..."

with

the

person

or

entity

designated

for

that

Issuance of the order has been determined by the Utah

Supreme Court to be synonymous with the date of the order.

Dusty's

v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Sup. Ct.
Oct. 30, 1992).
Section

12(1)(a),

supra., in clear and unambiguous

terms

requires an aggrieved party to "file" its request for review within
the required time limit.
mailing.

Courts distinguish between filing and

Carter v. Utah Power and Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1096

fn. 2 (Utah 1990).

Thus, the Commission has generally treated a

document as filed when it is received by the Commission.
generally Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mailing

See
is

therefore not the equivalent.
The language asserted by Maverik to require parties to mail
filings to the Commission has been conveniently misunderstood by
Maverik.

Maverik Brief at 18.

Since the Commission informs the parties that they must file
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Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1992), held that agency
orders are "issued" on the date the document bears on its face, not
the date they are mailed.
To put all of these together, under Rule 6, a party gets three
days for mailing jlf the time for him to take some action runs from
the date of service.

Under UAPA, the time to move for review runs

from the date of issuance of the order, not service of the order on
the parties.

Thus, Rule 6 does not apply, and parties who would

move for review of an ALJ's order do not get an additional three
days for mailing.
In this case, if this Court finds that Maverik was entitled to
an additional three days under Rule 6(e)(Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure), then the Commission would argue that it has considered
all of Maverik / s arguments which it set forth in its untimely
filing, and there was therefore no harm to Maverik.
For the above reasons, this Court should dismiss Maverik's
appeals.

V
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
GRANT MAVERIK'S REQUESTED ONE DAY
EXTENSION
The Commission concedes that Maverik has belatedly made out a
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good case in its second r e q u e s t for i ocnis i doral ion based on ijood
cause.

Appendix G.

H o w e v e r , M a v e r i k did not do so in its first

request for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h i c h it submitted on March l

i* .

response to the Commi ssioi i1" s or der of Febr oar: y 2

*o. •- \

E.

Maverik was
,n, s

good cause
- ;?

cause

informed

assertion

^"*"
4

.in that

order

of

-

th«

grounds

ui l a t e n e s s , and t h e requiremerr

P

: * .
r.

h v.

^or some r e a s o n Mayor i k chose

?

request for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
i I

i he

Commission

issued

its

order

upon

reconsideration on M a r c h 3 0 , 1 9 9 2 , t h a t M a v e r i k subsequently stat* id
'Limited R e q u e s t

R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n " t h e g r o u n d s for good
)iiii

considered t h a t M a v e r i k

had waived good c a u s e , and h a d a l r e a d y addressed the alleged errors
asserted
Oct obPi

by
11,

Maverik
l(M!li

notwithstanding

the

lateness

I i 1 J nq , I In*' t.'omm i sa i < >n d ui

of

Maveriks

mol

respond,

allowed the "Limited R e q u e s t for Reconsideration 1 1 to be denied as
a m a t t e r of lav

S e c t i o n 63-46b-13(3)(b)(1953 as amended

1988)

•• ' v is (let-mcMl d<*jm.'d

M a v e r i k ' s claim that thi

-limited Request for

remains p e n d i n g before t h e C o m m i s s i o n
action < ' -

.-

o n Apt i I

' I , ]'-»<•*,».

Reconsideration"

is in, error b e c a u s e of the

in deny i i lg Mav er I k 1 s i oquubl .

For tlio r e a s o n s discussed,- the appeals of M a v e r i k should be
dismissed.

and

43
VI
THE ALJ'S ORDER OF JUNE 2 6, 1991
AND SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 10,
1991 WERE SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC TO
ADVISE THE PARTIES OF THE JUDGMENT
AMOUNT
Maverik asserts that the orders of the ALJ are not specific
enough to determine the judgment amount.

Maverik reasons that

since no sum certain has been rendered that the remaining orders of
the Commission are not valid.

Maverik Brief at 20.

Again, this issue was addressed by the ALJ in her orders, as
well as by the Commission in its order of February 28, 1992.

The

orders of the ALJ are specific enough for the parties to be able to
determine damages.

The ALJ determined

among other

injunctive

provisions that Maverik was to:
1.

Pay McCord back pay at a rate of $3.35 per hour for

24 hours per week, or $80.40 per week from the date of termination
through the date of the order which was June 26, 1991. Appendix A,
Order, ALJ, June 26, 1991 at 8-9.

McCord was to be credited with

increases in the federal minimum wage effective April 1, 1990 to
$3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour. R.
138.
2. McCord's back pay was to be reduced by all earnings of
interim employment including Ashley Elementary School. R. 138.
3.

The ALJ awarded McCord attorney fees of $19,731, and
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costs of $1,536,26. R. 323.

Thus, the damages appear to be not difficult to compute for
Maverik, and, in fact, Maverik has apparently estimated the entire
amount of damages for McCord to be in the range of $8,000.

See

Appendix B, Supplemental Order, ALJ at 1; see also, TR. 254. Thus,
Maverik's claim that it cannot even estimate the damages belies the
facts.
For these reasons, the appeals of Maverik should be dismissed.
VII
MAVERIK HAS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED OF
ANY OF ITS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Maverik makes a vague and unsupported argument that it has
been deprived of its constitutional rights.

However, Maverik has

given us no particulars on which to consider its allegations.
Except for its assertion that it received no jury trial, Maverik
has not shown how it was prejudiced.

It claims that discovery is

limited, but it has not shown how its case has been injured.

It

claims that the evidentiary rules are relaxed, but it again fails
to show any harm.

Maverik has failed to show why the hearing

deprived it of due process.

Lopez v. Career Serv. Rev. Bd. . 188

Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 21 (Utah App. May 27, 1992).
For the above reasons, the appeals of Maverik
dismissed.

should

be
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CONCLUSION
The petition for review of Maverik in Docket Number 910413-CA
should be dismissed due to lack of finality of the order of June
26, 1991, and failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.

The

petition in Docket Number 920206-CA should be dismissed based upon
either failure to timely file, or lack of meritorious claims.
Alternatively,

if the petition

in Docket Number

910413-CA

is

allowed, then the petition for review in Docket Number 920206-CA
should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
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/Attorney for Respondent
/ Industrial Commission of Utah
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UADD Case No, 89-0031

VICKY ANN MCCORD,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT,
Charging Party,
vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on May 15,
1991, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Charging Party was present and represented by
James W. Stewart, Attorney at Law.
The Respondent was present and
Mitchell Barker, Attorney at Law.

represented

by

This is a claim of discrimination based on handicapped status
brought by Vicky McCord against Maverik Country Stores in
connection with her termination of employment.
The Charge was
filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on October 24,
1988. The Division issued its Determination on January 24, 1991
finding that Respondent had violated the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act of 1965, as amended, and issued an Order on the same date
requiring Respondent to conciliate the issue.
On February 15,
1991, Respondent requested a formal hearing before the Commission
on the Charge, and the request was granted.
A de novo evidentiary hearing was held, during which sworn
testimony and exhibits were presented.
During the hearing,
several rulings were made from the bench, including a denial of
Respondent/s oral Motion for Summary Judgment at the close of
Charging Party's case. The Administrative Law Judge also found
that Respondent's corporate officials received adequate notice of
the Charge and subsequent investigation through copies to the
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corporate office. Respondent argued that a handwritten notation by
an unidentified person of "no cause determination" on a letter
dated February 6, 1991 constituted a finding of no cause by UADD
(Exhibit A-16), but the Administrative Law Judge ruled that the
UADD's actual Determination, dated January 24, 1991, was the only
binding agency action on the merits*
The parties expressly
reserved the right to brief the question of attorney's fees
following the issuance of an Order on the merits.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and the
parties were given time to submit simultaneous closing briefs.
Having received said briefs, and having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fcict, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Vicky Ann McCord (McCord) was hired as a clerk by Maverik
Country Store on September 30, 1988. She was interviewed and hired
by Maverik's Store Manager, Connie Jones (Jones.) Jones had the
authority to hire and fire employees on behalf of Maverik, based on
her testimony and that of her supervisors. McCord 7 s position was
part-time, working six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35 per
hour. She worked eight shifts during her two weeks of employment,
Exhibit A-17. She was trained by Jones and another employee, Suzie
Jenkins (Jenkins.)
Her duties including cashiering, stocking
shelves, some bookkeeping and customer service.
At the time of hiring, McCord filled out an employment
application (Exhibit A - l ) , which included a question concerning
physical abilities:
"Do you have any respiratory, circulatory
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are
applying?" McCord checked the box marked "no."
The evidence demonstrates that McCord had been diagnosed with
a heart condition known as "mitral valve prolapse" during January,
1988, while living in California.
This diagnosis followed an
episode of tightness in her chest and a racing heartbeat.
She
consulted a Dr. Watkins, whose opinion is not contained in the
evidence. McCord's recollection of that consultation was that the
condition did not present any restrictions on her lifestyle or
employment.
She was given a "beta blocker" medication and
experienced no further problems.
The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice of the
generic information on mitral valve prolapse which was placed into
the record by stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A-ll. Said
information states, in part, that "mitral valve prolapse is a
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common and usually benign heart condition,.. An estimated 4 percent
to 7 percent of the population has MVP. . . Because MVP is so common,
some authorities believe that the condition is simply a normal
variant in heart structure, rather than a disease as such."
Evidence was also submitted from Dr. Ace Madsen, who examined
McCord after her termination, stating that McCord "is not at risk
because of her heart problems in regard to her working at her job."
(Exhibit A-7)
Dr. Madsen further stated that the mitral valve
prolapse problem, "should not interfere with any athletic or work
related endeavors."
On October 14, 1988, McCord reported for her shift at noon.
Jones was working in the store office. McCord began working but
felt some tightness
in her chest and grew
increasingly
uncomfortable. She asked Jones if she could leave the store and go
to the hospital to get her heart checked. In response to Jones 7
questions, she disclosed the mitral valve prolapse condition.
Jones agreed to allow her time off to seek medical attention.
At the hospital, McCord was examined and her heart was
monitored (Exhibit A-18.) McCord testified that the emergency room
doctor indicated her heart was fine, and suggested a change of her
"beta blocker" medication. After giving her a new prescription, he
released her to return to work.
While McCord was at the hospital, Jones referred to McCord7s
application and noted that no heart condition had been disclosed.
Jones later called the hospital to check on McCord, and could not
obtain any information.
McCord called Jones approximately two
hours later and offered to resume her shift. Jones told her to
stay home and rest. Jones then called McCord back and told her she
needed to come in to the store and discuss the situation with
Jones. McCord grew apprehensive and asked why. Jones stated that
she would prefer not to discuss the matter on the telephone, but
she went on to say that Jones 7 mother had died from heart problems,
and her son had recently had heart surgery. Jones commented that
she was concerned about the seriousness of McCord 7 s heart problem.
The parties dispute whether or not McCord then came into the
store for a subsequent discussion with Jones, or whether the
termination of employment took place by telephone.
In either
event, a discussion was had between Jones and McCord later that day
concerning McCord 7 s heart condition. Jones asked McCord why she
did not disclose the heart condition on her application. McCord
responded that she did not believe it presented any restrictions on
her performance of the job, and she did not consider it lifethreatening.
Jones then reiterated her statements about Jones 7
mother and son having heart problems, and stated she would be
afraid to leave McCord in the store alone. McCord stated that she
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did not perceive her condition to be as serious as that of Jones'
mother or son. Jones then terminated McCord's employment with
Maverik, stating that she would "do better somewhere else."
On the same day, Jones prepared a Record of Employee
Counseling form as required by Maverik policy (Exhibit A-4) which
states that McCord was terminated, and described the circumstances
in an attached handwritten letter. That letter states in part:
I told her I would worry about her being on the job
alone. She said it would not happen again and I then
told her how could she make that guarantee when she had
to leaver earlier and said she would not remain on the
job.
I alsso told her my sympathies were with her as my son had
had open heart surgury (sic) July 1st and my mom had died
of heart problems and complications following surgery.
At this time I told her she had not mentioned this at the
interview when asked if she had medical problems that
would interfere with her doing her job.
I then told her it would be best if she looked for other
less stressful employment.
Jones testified in the hearing that the reasons she stated in
Exhibits A-4 and A-5 were the actual reasons she made the decision
to terminate McCord. Exhibit A-5 is Jones' response to the AntiDiscrimination Division investigation.
It states in pertinent
part:
The day I terminated Vicki it was due to many things, all
relating to her inability to handle stress on the job and
do her job accurately...
According to Vicki she told me in the office that her
heart problem was sometimes brought on by stress. A
convenience store clerk is under nothing but stress. Not
only is the pace fast, but you are responsible for
stocking, cleaning during your shift, dealing with
customers and running the cash register...
My opinion at the time I terminated Vicki was that both
physically and mentally she would be more comfortable in
a job that had a slower pace.
There was some testimony at the hearing concerning McCord's
job performance. Both Jones and Jenkins testified that McCord had
difficulty reading the gasoline pump meters correctly. McCord
admitted this problem but added that Jones and Jenkins reassured
her that other employees had the same problem during the first few
weeks.
Jenkins and Jones testified that each had customers
complain about the smell of liquor on McCord's breath during work,
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and they smelled it also, Jones stated that she asked McCord on
one occasion if she had been drinking and she denied it. McCord
denied under oath the use of alcohol before working*
Jones and
Jenkins testified that McCord was accurate in her cash register
till, and McCord recalled having been complimented on her accuracy.
Despite the above comments, Jones did not mention any claimed
job performance problems with McCord during the termination
discussion. That discussion centered around Jones' perception of
a heart problem.
The Record of Employee Counseling which
documented the termination did not state any other reason for
counseling, although it contained blanks for such reasons as
"intoxication,lf
"personal
conduct,"
"unsatisfactory
work
performance," and "violation of company rules." (Exhibit A-4) It
also contains a statement that McCord / s performance was "average."
There is no documentation that Jones ever counseled or disciplined
McCord concerning the performance issues described above.
Substantial testimony was taken on such issues as the other
handicapped employees working for Maverik, and the employment
history of McCord prior to this job, but such matters are deemed
not relevant to the claim of handicapped discrimination.
Respondents witnesses Robert Child and Dana Dean, both senior
Maverik employees to Jones, testified that Jones did have authority
to hire and fire employees, and that she acted within the scope of
her authority with regard to McCord.
After being terminated by Maverik, McCord pursued other
employment. She testified and introduced evidence showing that she
made application at twenty-six places of employment during 19891991 (Exhibit A - 8 ) . She did briefly work at Ashley Elementary
School as a janitor from November, 1988 through January, 1989. She
anticipates working for the Forest Service this year. There was
also some attenuated testimony at the hearing concerning the
allegation that Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements
of a personal nature about McCord to third persons in the Vernal,
Utah area. There is, however, no direct evidence that Maverik or
its employees ever interfered in McCord's ability to seek other
employment.
Based on the testimony of Jones, it is apparent that Jones
retains some hostile feelings toward McCord.
She testified to
making a derogatory personal comment about McCord while waiting to
testify in the hearing. She also admitted during testimony that
she did not consider McCord to be honest nor "a good person."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Utah law provides that it is a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice for an employer to terminate any person,
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otherwise qualified, because of handicap, U.C.A. 34-35-6.
"Handicap" is defined in the rules promulgated thereunder as "a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one of
more of an individual's major life activities. Being regarded as
having a handicap is equivalent to being handicapped or having a
handicap," R486-1-2(F)(1).
"Major life activity" is defined to include experiencing
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment
because of a handicap," R486-1-2(F)(3). "'Is regarded as having an
impairment' mecins (a) has a physical or mental impairment that does
not substantially limit major life activities but is treated as
constituting such a limitation; (b) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as
a result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the definition of
physical or mental impairment above but is treated as having such
an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6).
The statute and regulations further provide that "An employer
shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program,"
R486-1-2(J)(1).
Applying the above law to the facts, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that Maverik Country Stores engaged in a prohibited
employment practice under Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord.
Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of McCord
as handicapped.
There was no evidence that McCord's actual
physical condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical
or mental impairment, but it was "treated as constituting such a
limitation," R486-1-2(F)(6) (a) and further, did "substantially
limit major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6)(c).
Specifically, Jones' attitude toward persons with heart
conditions was shown to be discriminatory.
McCord has met her
burden of proof by showing that she was terminated from employment,
the termination was due to her employer's perception of her as
handicapped, she was otherwise qualified to perform the work (since
no other reason was given for termination at the time it became
effective), and her employer made no attempt or inquiry regarding
possible accommodations. Her employer did not even seek to obtain
medical advice about the perceived handicap —
its symptoms,
treatment or how it would affect McCord's job performance — before
making the immediate decision to terminate.
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Maverik asserts that McCord failed to meet her burden because
she is not handicapped, and argues the very limited medical
evidence in support of this position. The Administrative Law Judge
concedes that McCord's condition of mitral valve prolapse in this
instance does not appear to present any impairment to McCord's
ability to perform her job. Nevertheless, the law is clearly aimed
at both actual and perceived handicaps.
This is a case where
Manager Jones' perception of handicap (based on Jones' emotional
and unsubstantiated analogy to her own family situation — not on
any medical evidence) was discriminatory in itself.
Maverik also urges the Commission to find that "convenience
store clerking is not a substantial life activity," Respondent's
Closing Brief, p. 6, and therefore, discrimination cannot be found.
Maverik's counsel misses the point of the anti-discrimination laws
and regulations.
Mc Cord testified that she pursued permanent
employment with Maverik as a means of supporting herself and her
son.
It would be absurd for the Commission to engage in an
analysis of which types of employment are "career" or "non-career,"
as Respondent argues. "Employment" is clearly listed as a category
in the litany of "major life activities" set forth by Rule, and
McCord's employment was terminated.
Maverik asserts that McCord's performance problems were the
actual reason for termination.
This is not supported by the
evidence.
Manager Jones alone made the decision to terminate
McCord's employment.
The best evidence of her basis for this
decision is the contemporaneous document she prepared at the time,
Exhibit A-4, Record of Employee Counseling, and the reasons she
gave McCord in the termination discussion.
Both state the reason
as McCord's heart problem, and Jones' non-medical perception that
it was related to job stress. Subsequently, Jones has stated that
factors such as pump reading problems, general nervousness, and
possible drinking contributed to the decision to terminate. Since
none of these was discussed with McCord or documented by Jones
prior to termination and this claim being filed, such suggestions
lack credibility. Further, McCord had only worked at Maverik for
two weeks prior to termination, and there is no indication that
these factors had led Jones to consider termination or even
discipline, until the heart condition became known.
Finally, Maverik claims that McCord is not otherwise qualified
to perform the job. McCord was presumably performing the job up
until the moment she asked for the time to go to the hospital, and
her qualifications had not been questioned at that point.
At
termination her performance was rated by Jones as "average." For
Maverik to suggest in hindsight that McCord's qualifications were
lacking begs the question.
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McCord has suffered damages as a result of Maverik / s
prohibited employment practice, in that she has been deprived of
wages and benefits of employment.
Utah law states that if an
employer is found to have engaged in a prohibited discriminatory
practice, the Commission shall "issue an order requiring the
respondent to cease any discrimination or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the complaining party, including
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorney,s fees," U.C.A.
34-35-7.1(9).
Awards of back pay are governed by federal law, 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5, and the purpose thereof is to make the party whole for
injuries suffered through discrimination. In this case, back pay
is calculated at a rate of $3.35 per hour for 24 hours per week, or
$80.40 per week.
The period of back pay runs from the date of
termination through the date of this Order. While McCord argues
for the use of incremental raises, based on those received by
another employee, the Administrative Law Judge does not find that
probative in McCord's case. The evidence is too speculative to
establish that McCord would have, in fact, qualified for these
incremental
raises by passing the tests required.
The
Administrative* Law Judge does incorporate by reference the
increases in federal minimum wage, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80
per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour, for
purposes of Ccilculating the back pay award (Exhibit A-12.)
Respondent asks the Commission to terminate McCord's back pay
award as of the date she secured employment as a janitor for Ashley
Elementary School in November, 1988. This employment lasted only
two months.
A review of pertinent case law demonstrates that
victims of discrimination do have a duty to mitigate their back pay
damages by actively seeking other suitable employment, and "Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). Therefore,
McCord's back pay award must be reduced by all earnings from
interim employment, including Ashley Elementary School.
However, the Ashley Elementary employment does not toll the
period of back pay since McCord's employment there was not
terminated voluntarily.
Consistent with case law enunciated in
Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (1985), "the
[back pay] period is tolled when the quit is motivated by personal
reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal
convenience," Id. at 1278.
Since McCord was required to quit
Ashley Elementary due to illness beyond her control, that period of
employment should operate as an offset only against the back pay
award.
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McCord argues that front pay ought to be awarded in lieu of
reinstatement with Maverik Country Stores, due to the hostility
shown McCord by Jones and other employees during the pendency of
these proceedings*
The Administrative Law Judge finds that
reinstatement is still an appropriate remedy, given the fact that
Jones no longer works for Maverik, substantial time has passed
since these incidents and presumably, reinstatement could be
arranged in another Maverik location or capacity.
McCord is entitled to the value of employment benefits she has
lost as a result of the discriminatory termination. No proof was
introduced of the specific Maverik benefit programs to which McCord
could have been entitled, and therefore, none can be awarded based
on the evidence in the record.
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's
fees award, pending this Order, and shall address that in
supplemental briefs to the Commission.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores is found
liable of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice in the
nature of handicap discrimination against Vicky Ann McCord, and
that Maverik Country Stores cease any discriminatory or prohibited
employment practices immediately;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores provide full
relief to Vicky Ann McCord, including reinstatement to employment
in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with full
rights, privileges and protections of employment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay to Vicky
Ann McCord back pay, at the rates specified above, from the date of
unlawful termination until the date of this Order, subject to all
lawful offsets due to interim employment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take such
affirmative action as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from
its environment any employment discrimination prohibited by law;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores not
retaliate against Vicky Ann McCord for having exercised her right
to file this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay a
reasonable attorney,s fee to counsel for Vicky Ann McCord, subject
to both parties submitting written legal briefs on this question to
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the Commission; McCord's counsel shall submit his brief on
attorney's fees on or before twenty days from the date of this
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response brief, if any, on
attorney's fees on or before twenty days thereafter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take any
other applicable and reasonable relief as may be necessary to
restore Vicky Ann McCord to her rightful position,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

^frth

day of

ty.t^J

ATTEST:

^Tw^J €/ ./f/a
Patricia O. Ashb^
Commission Secretary
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vs.

*

KAVERIK COUNTRY STORE,

*
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ORDER
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On June 26, 1991, an Order was issued in the above case,
finding that Maverik Country Store illegally discriminated against
Vicky Ann McCord on the basis of a perceived handicap. The parties
were granted additional time to submit legal briefs on the amount
of legal fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, pursuant to
U . C A . 34-35-7.1(9).
Said briefs and supporting affidavits have
been received and reviewed by the Administrative Lav Judge, who now
enters the following Supplemental Order on the sole issue of
attorney's fees.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Charging Party's counsel has made application for $25,400.50
in attorney's fees and $1,536.26 in costs in connection with the
prosecution of this claim. The attorney's fees represent the work
of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec and Diane Abbeglen,
at the hourly rates of $125, $80 and $80, respectively. The costs
involve mailing, transcribing, witness costs, phone calls, computer
time and copying.
Respondent opposes the award of the attorney's fees as
claimed,
and
alleges
that
the
fees
are
overstated
and
unconscionable.
They note that the entire damage award to Ms.
McCord was only in the range of $8,000, and the fee claimed far
exceeds that amount.
The Administrative Law Judge has carefully reviewed the
pleadings on this issue, and has considered the circumstances of
the case itself, which she heard on behalf of the Commission. She
has also reviewed Utah cases which provide guidance on the award of
attorney's fees, including Travner v. Gushing, 688 P.2d S56 (Utah
1984); Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and fcixifi
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The attorney's
fees in this case are awarded on the basis of U . C A . 34-35-7.1(9).
Case law identifies the following key factors to consider in
•warding attorney's fees: relationship of the fee to the amount
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recovered, novelty and difficulty of the issues, overall result
achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights,
Travner, supra, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case,
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, customary
fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved, Cabrera, supra. "The total amount of attorneys
fees awarded in [a] case cannot be said to be unreasonable just
because it is greater than the amount recovered on the contract,"
Cabrera at 625.
This was a relatively straightforward claim of handicap
discrimination, which required a one-day administrative hearing.
No pre-trial proceedings or pleadings were required* Very limited
discovery was conducted, and the majority of the work for the
attorneys on both sides consisted of preparation for, and
attendance at, the actual hearing. It was necessary for Charging
Party to initiate a formal proceeding to vindicate her rights,
since the Respondent had not acknowledged its liability under the
"cause" finding of the Utah Anti-Discrimination DivisionThe
overall result obtained by Charging Party's counsel was successful,
and the hourly rate billed by counsel was within the customary
range for the Salt Lake City legal community.
Charging Party's
counsel was knowledgeable and competent in the area of employment
discrimination law.
However, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was a lack
of efficiency in presenting the case, and the number of hours spent
on particular pleadings was excessive. A disproportionately large
block of Charging Party's attorneys' time was spent preparing
written closing arguments, and later, preparing the brief on
attorney's fees.
This is regrettable, due to the fact that the Administrative
Law Judge customarily hears only oral closing Arguments/ but herein
made an accommodation to the parties' request and allowed vritten
closing arguments.
Parties in an administrative hearing are
expected to come to the hearing prepared to make both opening and
closing statements orally at the bearing.
Certainly it was not
envisioned that allowing a written, instead of oral, presentation
would increase the Charging Party's total legal costs by a factor
of nearly one-third. Moreover, such charges defeat the purpose of
handling discrimination claims in an administrative forum, where
judicial economy is a priority.
The Administrative Law Judge suspects that both parties could
not resist the urge to relitigate the hearing itself by submitting
extensive written closing arguments• This is very understandable
in light of both attorneys' conduct during the eight-hour hearing,
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in which objections and arguments continually interrupted the flow
of testimony, and there was a notable lack of cooperation between
counsel
on
even
the
smallest
evidentiary
matters.
The
Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that those circumstances left
the impression that perhaps the hearing testimony needed to be represented in written, summary form, and then re-argued as part of
closing arguments.
Unfortunately, this process required 34.10
hours of Mr. Stewart's time, and 3 6.75 hours of Ms. Krivanec's
time, according to the fee affidavits submitted. That expenditure
of time approaches the amount of hours spent in hearing preparation
itself, and is found to be excessive.
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's
counsel in connection with the written closing arguments are
partially disallowed as follows: of the 34.10 hours spent by Mr.
Stewart on closing arguments, two-thirds (23 hours) are disallowed;
of the 3 6.75 hours spent by Ms. Krivanec on closing arguments, twothirds (24 hours) are disallowed.
This leaves Mr. Stewart with
106.10 total compensable hours and Ms. Krivanec with 64.40 total
compensable hours.
The balance of the attorney's fees claimed include substantial
time for preparation of the pleadings on the attorney's fee issue
itself: 37.05 hours of Ms. Abbeglen's time at $80.00/hour «=
$2,960.00.
As can be seen from the hearing transcript, the
Administrative Law Judge was very interested in handling the
attorney's fees issue in the simplest and least costly manner. She
asked the parties if they could stipulate to merely submitting
attorney's fees affidavits following her ruling, and not requiring
a further hearing on that single issue. The parties so agreed, and
again, it was not envisioned that by doing so, nearly $3,000 would
be spent on the preparation of those affidavits.
(Respondent's
counsel matched this lack of restraint by filing two separate legal
briefs contesting the award.)
Claims of attorney's fees are
routine and commonly done by large firms such as Charging Party's
counsel. It should not require more than a few hours of organizing
and tabulating bills.
The affidavits from other attorneys in
similar practices are superfluous in an administrative forum, and
are not necessary unless specifically requested by the A U .
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party'%
counsel in connection with the legal fees claim are partially
disallowed as follows: of the 37.05 hours spent by Ms. Abbeglen on
the legal fees claim, two-thirds (25 hours) are disallowed, leaving
16.45 total compensable hours-
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The remainder of Charging Party's legal fees are specifically
found to be reasonable and supported by the evidence, and are
awarded to Charging Party as a matter of statutory legal right.
The costs have been examined closely and all appear to be related
to the prosecution of this claim. They are not excessive and were
reasonably necessary for case preparation; therefore, they will be
awarded as claimed.
Finally, the Administrative Lav Judge rejects the argument
that Charging Party's fee is unreasonable because it far exceeds
the damage award. Damage awards in employment cases are strictly
limited to lost wages/benefits, and it is not reasonable to expect
that Charging Party's counsel could have prepared and litigated
this case for some fraction of a few thousand dollars.
This is
especially true in this case, where Respondent's counsel asserted
many frivolous arguments unsupported by tenets of discrimination
law. The principles at stake in a discrimination case render it
more valuable to a Charging Party than a mere dollar figure, and
attorneys' fees may exceed the actual damages in many employment
cases.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The attorney's fees claim submitted by Charging Party's
counsel is reasonable and supported by the evidence, with the
exception of two-thirds of the hours spent on written closing
arguments and two-thirds of the hours spent on legal fees
affidavits and briefs. Following such deductions, Respondent shall
be liable for Charging Party's attorney's fees and costs, pursuant
to U.C.A. 35-34-7.1(9)•
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store,
pay the legal fees of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in
connection with the handicap discriiriination claim before this
Commission, in the amount of $19,731.00*
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent, Kaverik Country Store,
pay the legal costs of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this
Commission, in the amount of $1,536.26.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
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date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors a:
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and n<
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Lav Judge
Certified on this
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APPENDIX C
Maverik's Request for Review of 10/11/91

Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
David C. Cundick, #4817
Attorneys for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
HEARING ROOM, 160 EAST 300 SOUTH
P. O. BOX 510910
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84151-0910
UADD # 89-0031
ooOoo
VICKY ANN MCCORD
Charging Party

REQUEST FOR REVIEW

vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE
Respondent
ooOoo
Respondent Maverik Country Stores, Inc. hereby requests a
review by the full Commission of the "SUPPLIMENTAL ORDER" and
the earlier findings, conclusions and order, issued on September
10, 1991 and June 26, 1991 respectively.
The errors in the September 10, 1991 order include
whether the amount of attorney fees awarded is erroneously high,
and whether it should bear some relation to the damages sought.

As to both order, did the ALJ err in failing to determine
the amount of damages?
The errors in the June 26 Order, phrased as issues for

4
<5~

*
*

*

» « «

•
* •

%

•
* f

'

•
«

review, are as follows:
I.

Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in awarding McCord lost

wages for time periods after she acquired a better paying job,
which she later quit?
and unreasonable.

{Arbitrary and capricious or oppressive

Petty v. Utah State Bd. of Regents, 595 P.2d

481 (Utah 1979)}.
II.

Did the ALJ err in finding that Maverik treated McCord "as

if" she were handicapped?
Drilling Co. v. Board
(Utah App. 1989)}.
and capricious?

(Substantial evidence test.

Grace

of Review of Indust. Com., 776 P.2d

63

Alternatively," was that finding arbitrary

{Hurst v. Board of the Indust. Com., 723 P.2d

416 (Utah 1986)}.
III. Did the ALJ incorrectly find that any perceived abnormality
constitutes
standard —

a

perceived

"handicap".

{Correction

of

error

review for correctness of statutory interpretation.

Hurley v. Board

of Review of Indust. Com., 767 P.2d 524

(Utah

1988)}.
IV.

Did the ALJ err in finding that clerking at a convenience

store is a "major life activity" under the facts of the case?
{Rational basis and reasonableness, applying law to facts, Dept.
of Air Force v. Dept. of Emplmt. S e c , 786 P.2d 1361 (Utah App.
1990)}.
V.

Was it error to find handicapped discrimination when no

medical
test.

expert

was called

to testify?

{Substantial

evidence

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com.,

776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}.
VI.

Did the ALJ err in not ruling that McCord cannot prevail,

since she has

not produced substantial

"otherwise qualified" to act in the job.
test.

evidence that she was
{Substantial evidence

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indust. Com.,

776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)}.
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.

« **

•

Authorities respecting issues on review.
R486-1-3CF)(1),(3),(4) and (6), Utah Admin. Code§ 34-4-2(9), Utah Code
§ 34-35-1, et seq., Utah Code.
§ 34-35-6(a)(i), Utah Code.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 637 (Utah
1983).

Maverik's Trial Brief is attached, and its arguments are
all incorporated by reference.
Respectively Submitted this

?-)td—
/
day of October, 1991.

7?2>kfi~4^

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
David C. Cundick
Certificate of Mailing

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
Benjamin Sims of the Commissionf &pd^ to James W* Stewartf
counsel for claimant McCordf on the /0 -—-day of Octoberf 1991 f
at 1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101.

7nA ^>&<

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX D
Industrial Commission's Order of 2/28/92

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UADD CASE NO, 89-0031
VICKY ANN MCCORD,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
REVIEW

*

MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE,
Defendants.

*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for
Review of the administrative law judge's Order dated June 26, 1991
which was submitted by respondents. The authority for review is
conferred by U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11), and Section 63-46b-12.
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24,
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24,
1991.
Respondent
requested
a formal hearing
before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10,
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and
September 10, 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order,
and could not therefore contest its provisions.
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. McCord was hired as a
clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. She was
interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store manager. Ms.
McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35
per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. (Exhibit A17) . She performed cashiering, bookkeeping, customer service, and
stocking shelves.
She had answered "no" to respondent's employment application
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap
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which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are
applying?" However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a heart
condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while living in California
in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and a racing
heartbeat. Ms. McCord related that her doctor had informed her
that the condition required no changes in lifestyle or employment.
She was prescribed a "beta blocker," and she had no further
difficulties.
Both parties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...." Dr.
Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems
in regard to her working at her job." Exhibits A-ll, A-7.
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some
tightness in heir chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable. She
asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the hospital to
get her heart checked.
Ms. McCord disclosed her mitral valve
prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to questions.
While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms.
McCord's application for employment. No heart condition had been
noted by Ms. McCord. The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms.
McCord / s heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change
of beta blocker. Although Ms. McCord called about two hours later,
and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told to stay home
and rest.
It is not clear where the termination of employment took
place. There is some dispute about whether the termination took
place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same
day as the hospital episode. During several of the discussions
between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on that day, Ms.
Jones stated that her mother had died from heart problems, and her
son had recently had open heart surgery. During the termination
discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the seriousness of
Ms. McCord's heart problems. Ms. Jones then asked Ms. McCord why
she did not disclose the heart condition on her application.
Ms.
McCord replied that she believed that it presented no restrictions
on her, and that she did not consider it to be life threatening.
Ms. Jones responded that she (Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave
Ms. McCord in the store alone. She then terminated Ms. McCord's
employment.
A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms.
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination
in a typewritten attachment.
Exhibit A-4.
This form and
attachment show that Ms. Jones was greatly concerned about Ms.
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McCord / s heart problem, and the potential that Ms. McCord would
have another medical episode under the stress created if she
continued employment at Maverik. Ms. Jones wrote that "I then told
her it would be best if she looked for other less stressful
employment.,f Id.
Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress
on the job and do her job accurately...." Exhibit A-5. Again, it
appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress factor.
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were
discussed:
1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump
meters; and, 2) allegations that customers and employees had
complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord's breath during
work.
Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before working, and Ms.
Jones and another employee testified that Ms. McCord's cash
register till was accurate.
Significantly, none of these
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or
were written on the termination form or attachment.
There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord.
Ms. McCord testified and introduced evidence that after her
termination she attempted to find employment at 2 6 employment
locations during 1989-1991. Exhibit A-8. She worked for a short
time as a janitor at an elementary school from November 1988
through January 1989.
Although there was some testimony that
Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord
to other persons in the Vernal area, the ALJ found no direct
evidence that Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms.
McCord's ability to seek other employment.
The ALJ then concluded as a matter of law that "Maverik
Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under
Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord."
The ALJ based this
conclusion on Maverik's perception of Ms. McCord as handicapped.
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did
'substantially limit major life activities only as a
result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment. . . . '
Order, ALJ at 6 (June 26, 1991), citations omitted.
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The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her
conclusions of law that Ms. McCord was otherwise qualified to
perform the work.
The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores:
1.
Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice in the nature of handicap discrimination.
2. An order to Maverik to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practices.
3. Full relief to Ms. McCord including reinstatement to
employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with
full rights, privileges and protections of employment.
4. Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for
24 hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date
of termination through June 26, 1991 with increases in pay
commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to
$4.25 per hour, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim
employment.
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action
as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any
employment discrimination prohibited by law.
6.
No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for
having exercised her right to file this action.
7. Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to
counsel for Ms. McCord.
8.
Maverik was to take any other applicable and
reasonable relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her
rightful position.
9. And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of June 26,
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections,
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or
appeal unless such a filing were made.
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ISSUE ONE
WHETHER MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES
TIMELY FILED ITS MOTIONS FOR REVIEW?
The ALJ issued her initial Order on June 26, 1991. She then
issued a supplemental order dealing only with attorney's fees on
September 10, 1991. The Reguest for Review by Maverik was received
by the IC on October 11, 1991.
This reguest was not received
within the 3 0 days after issuance of the initial order on June 26,
1991, as reguired by U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(l)(a), and good cause
for the delay has not been shown by Maverik under U.C.A. Section
63-46b-l(9). The latter statute states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
Thus, the order of June 26, 1991 cannot be reviewed by the IC, and
therefore becomes the final order of the IC with regard to the
issues addressed within it. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11)(b).
With regard to the order of September 10, 1991 which related
to attorney/s fees, the filing by Maverik of its Request for Review
was mailed by it on October 10, 1991, and was received by the IC on
October 11, 1991. R486-1-4-5 (Utah Admin. Code) requires that a
request for review be submitted in accordance with U.C.A. Section
63-46b-12.
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) requires an aggrieved party to:
File a written request for review within 30 days
after the issuance of the order with the person
or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule.
The operative portions of the statute above are "file a
written request for review within 3 0 days. . .with the person. . .ff and
"after issuance of the order...." Since issuance of the order is
the first in the sequence of events which triggers the 3 0 day
period, the nature of issuance must be determined.
There is little case law construing the meaning of issuance,
but what little there is indicates that issuance of an order is
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synonymous with delivery or mailing. Sunnvside Nurseries, Inc. v.
Agri. Labor Relations Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, 93 C.A.3d 922.
The Order of the ALJ shows that it was mailed on September 10,
1991. Therefore, the issuance took place on that date.
It has been suggested that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(URCP), Rule 6(e) gives the aggrieved party an extra three days to
file.
This reliance is misplaced since Section 63-46b-12(1)(a)
clearly establishes the timing standard for this administrative
process.
Since Maverik's Request for Review was received on October 11,
1991, that is the date of filing. That date was on the 31st day
after issuance, and was not timely. However, the IC will discuss
the remaining issues as raised by Maverik for the benefit of the
parties.
ISSUE TWO
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS "ERRONEOUSLY
HIGH, AND SHOULD BEAR SOME RELATION
TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT?"
U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) allows the ALJ to, among other
actions, award attorneys' fees and costs. The ALJ awarded Ms.
McCord's counsel legal fees of $19,731, and awarded Ms. McCord
$1,536.26 for costs in connection with her claim before the IC.
Maverik asserted the issue of whether the fees were
"erroneously high, and should bear some relation to the damages
sought" in its Revised Memorandum Opposing Attorney Fee Award which
was received by the ALJ on August 13, 1991. Ms. McCord's legal
counsel had sought $25,400.50 which was claimed to represent the
work of three eittorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec, and Diane
Abbeglen, at the hourly rates of $125, $80, and $80, respectively.
The ALJ reduced the fees to the amount noted in the immediately
preceding paragraph.
The ALJ correctly used the factors to both award and to reduce
the award based on case law which identified the following key
factors to consider in awarding attorney's fees: relationship of
the fee to the amount recovered, novelty and difficulty of the
issues, overall result achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit
to vindicate rights, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,
customary fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of
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the attorneys involved.
10, 1991).

Supplemental Order of the ALJ, at 2 (Sep.

Maverik asserts that Ms. McCord will recover approximately
$8,000, and that the attorney's fees are excessive when that
recovery is considered.
The amount in controversy is a factor
only, and it generally takes as much time to try a discrimination
case for an employee making a minimum wage as it does to try one
for a supervisor receiving much more compensation. Cf. Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); Cabrera v.
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985).
Considering all relevant factors, we cannot say that the
amount awarded was excessive based on the ALJ's reasoning to the
effect that this hearing required one full day; that the attorneys
for Ms. McCord carefully documented their hourly charges; that Ms.
McCord had to initiate the hearing to vindicate her rights since
Maverik did not acknowledge its liability notwithstanding the cause
finding issued by the UADD; that the result obtained by Ms.
McCord's counsel who were knowledgeable and competent in employment
discrimination law was successful, and that the fees charged were
within the customary range for the Salt Lake City legal community.
Since Ms. McCord's counsel have not challenged the reduction
of their fees, we will not discuss the reduction except to note
that we find the reduction to be reasonable and appropriate.
For the above reasons, we find the attorney's fees awarded to
Ms. McCord's attorneys to be appropriate in light of the
documentation, expertise and work required in her case.
ISSUE THREE
WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT
OF DAMAGES?
Maverik styled its issue as stated in the heading above, but
more specifically at page 2 of its request asked whether the ALJ
abused her discretion in awarding Ms. McCord lost wages for time
periods "after she acquired a better paying job, which she later
quit?"
It is appropriate to award back pay from the date of the
discrimination until the date of judgement or the date of trial.
Gathercole v. Global Associates, 560 F.Supp. 642, 647 (1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1984); Wells v. North
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Carolina Bd of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983)
cert, den. 464 U.S. 1044, 79 L.ed 2d 176, 14 S.Ct. 712. The ALJ
awarded back pay in this instance from the date of termination
until the date of her order.
Federal law governs the award of back pay in other types of
discrimination cases, but is instructive in this case. 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e-5. The purpose of an award of back pay is to make
the party whole for injuries suffered through discrimination. The
employer is not responsible for losses willingly incurred by Ms.
McCord. Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985). We can find nothing in the file which shows that
Ms. McCord willingly incurred any loss.
When she left her
employment at the elementary school, she did so due to illness
beyond her control. The ALJ correctly required only an offset by
reducing Ms. McCord's award by all earnings from interim
employment, including her elementary school job.
We therefore find that the ALJ was correct in law and fact in
light of the entire record.
ISSUE FOUR
DID THE ALJ ERR WHEN SHE
FOUND THAT MAVERIK HAD TREATED
MS. MCCORD AS IF SHE WERE HANDICAPPED?
Maverik asserts that the ALJ erred when she found that Maverik
had treated Ms. McCord as if she were handicapped. The ALJ found
that "Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of
McCord as handicapped." Order of the ALJ, at 6 (June 26, 1991).
Maverik now claims that Ms. McCord is not handicapped since mitral
valve prolapse is a common condition usually accompanied by no
symptoms at all. Trial Brief as incorporated into the Request for
Review, Maverik Country Stores, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1991).
This issue is relevant as it relates to U.C.A. Section 34-356(1)(a)(i) which states in pertinent part:
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or
to discharge, demote, terminate any person, ...
because of ... handicap ....
The Utah statutes do not discuss the concept of perceived
handicap. However, R486-1-2 (Utah Admin. Code) was promulgated by
the UADD under the authority of U.C.A. 34-35-5(b), and provides
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that the subject individual will be treated as if he or she has a
handicap where the individual:
Has a record of such an impairment . . . or has
been regarded as having, a mental or physical
impairment ....
R486-1-2F5 (Utah Admin. Code).
The Utah Administrative Code further provides that the
individual may be regarded as having a handicap if others think
that he or she has such a disability, or is considered by others to
have a limitation on a major life activity. R486-l-2F6a,b,c (Utah
Admin. Code) . A person who has no disability or handicap, but who
is treated by others as if he or she is impaired (perception of
impairment) , may be just as impaired by virture of treatment by
others as one who is actually impaired.
The ALJ correctly found that the termination was due to Ms.
McCord's employer's perception of her as handicapped, and that she
was otherwise qualified to perform the work. Finally, her employer
made no attempt to obtain medical advice as to the perceived
handicap, or whether she could reasonably accommodate Ms. McCord's
perceived medical condition.
We therefore conclude that this asserted issue by Maverik is
without merit, and that the ALJ was correct.
ISSUE FIVE
WHETHER THE ALJ INCORRECTLY
FOUND THAT ANY PERCEIVED
ABNORMALITY CONSTITUTES
A PERCEIVED HANDICAP?
It is clear to us that the ALJ did not find that any perceived
abnormality constitutes a perceived handicap. Maverik misstates
the findings of the ALJ. A finding of abnormality is not required.
Whatever impairment exists must be either a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's
major life activities, U.C.A. Section 34-35-3(9), and where the
impairment does not actually exist either in part or in whole, the
perception must also rise to the level of substantially limiting
one or more of a person's major life activities.
Major life activity is defined as including experiencing
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment
because of a handicap...." R486-1-2F3 (Utah Admin. Code).
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A person is regarded as having an impairment when he or she
(a) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities, but is treated as constituting such a
limitation; (b) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the
attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (c) has none of
the impairments listed in the definition of physical or mental
impairment above, but is treated as having such an impairment.
R486-1-2F6 (Utah Admin. Code).
Here, Maverik terminated Ms. McCord based on its perception of
the severity of Ms. McCord's medical condition.
Ms. McCord's
condition was probably not an impairment, but her condition was
treated as a serious one by Maverik.
A job is a major life
activity, including clerking at a convenience store, and there is
a legal requirement to reasonably accommodate such employees unless
undue hardship can be shown.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the ALJ met the
requirements of law in light of the whole record.
ISSUE SIX
WHETHER A MEDICAL EXPERT IS
REQUIRED TO TESTIFY BEFORE
A FINDING OF HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
CAN BE MADE?
Both parties stipulated before the hearing that mitral valve
prolapse is usually a benign condition, and that Exhibit A-ll would
be "authoritative on the condition of Mitral Valve Prolapse...."
Exhibit A-ll.
Having stipulated that this exhibit would be
authoritative as to Ms. McCord's condition, there appears to be no
good reason why a medical expert is required. The question before
the ALJ was not whether Ms. McCord was actually handicapped, but
whether Maverik treated her as if she was disabled. The evidence
is clear that even though Ms. McCord was capable of performing her
job, Maverik's manager perceived her to have a serious heart
problem, and as a result fired her.
No medical expert was required.
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ISSUE SEVEN
WHETHER MS. MCCORD SHOWED THAT
SHE WAS QUALIFIED TO ACT IN THE
JOB?
Maverik contends that Ms. McCord never showed that she was
qualified for the job from which she was terminated. At the time
of Ms. McCord's termination she was told that she was terminated
because of her heart condition. It was only after the termination,
and after an investigation was requested by the UADD, that Maverik
gave any other reasons for Ms. McCord's termination.
While working at Maverik, Ms. McCord's supervisor was
confident enough in her abilities to leave her alone to perform her
duties in the store after only three days of training. Ms. Jones,
her supervisor, had never confronted Ms. McCord with any of the
allegations which were subsequently lodged against her after the
termination. In fact, Ms. McCord was scheduled to work on the day
of her termination alone for most of her shift.
At the hearing, Maverik alleged that Ms. McCord was not
otherwise qualified because of problems she had reading the gas
pumps. However, a witness who worked for Maverik testified that
everyone had problems reading the pump meters.
Ms. McCord
testified that prior to her termination she had learned to read the
meters, and that she had been complimented on her accuracy on the
till.
It is significant that Ms. McCord was apparently performing
her job duties properly until the time that she asked to go to the
hospital, and that her qualifications had not been questioned up to
that point.
This alleged error is therefore without merit, and we find
that the ALJ determinations and conclusions were correct.
CONCLUSION
For all the previous reasons, we find that the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge
were correct in law and fact in view of substantial evidence in the
whole record.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the orders of the administrative law judge
dated June 26, 1991, and September 10, 1991 are affirmed.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
Court of Appeals within 3 0
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REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
Applicant,
UADD Case No. 89-0031
vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE (sic),
Defendant.

TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH:
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission
reconsider its "Order

Denying

Review",

issued on February 28, 1992.

This Request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code.
The grounds for relief from the order are as follows:
1. The Commission has erroneously interpreted section 63-46b1(9) to make the filing of Maverik 1 s Petition for Review untimely,
and to avoid exercise of the Commission's discretion in extending
any such deadline.

The statute expressly applies only to time

1

periods "established for judicial review."

It does not apply to

agency review,
2.

To the extent necessary, Maverik hereby moves for a one

day extension to petition for review by the Commission.
3.
the June

The Commission has misperceived the law, in holding that
26, 1991 order

specifically

and

of the ALJ was

expressly

reserved

in

final.

that

Issues were

order

(including

attorney fees), and damages were not even calculated.

The order

was comparable to a partial summary judgment, which cannot be
appealed

to the next judicial

undetermined.

level so long as issues remain

So long as the agency's order reserves anything to

the agency for further decision, it is not a final order.
Board

of Review,
4.

Sloan

v.

781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Not being a final order, the petition for the Commission

to review it could not have been tardy.
5.

While the commission acknowledges that the amount of

recovery is a factor in determining attorney fee reasonableness,
its Order Denying Review fails to expressly consider what effect
the amount of recovery had in this case.

See Order Denying Review,

page seven.
6.

Attorney fees could not have been awarded and cannot be

evaluated for reasonableness with the case in its current posture,
since the amount of principal recovery has not been calculated, nor
2

can it be calculated based on the any order the Commission has
entered to date,
7. The Commission erred (Order Denying Review, page eight) in
announcing how the damages could be calculated. It did so based on
assumptions about voluntariness of McCord's losses, without basing
the observation on any finding by the ALJ to that effect. Damages
simply

cannot

be

calculated

without

further

hearing

and

supplemental findings.
5. The Commission failed to consider the leading cases on the
issues involved, particularly whether McCord can be said to have
been treated "as if" she were "handicapped."
City
Board

v.

Confer,

of Review,

of Review,

See, e.g. Salt

674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Grace Drilling
776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989) and Hurley

Lake
Co.

v.

v.

Board

767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).

For all of the above reasons, Maverik requests that the
Commission reconsider in full its Order Denying Review.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 1992.

R'ondld C. Bairker, Mitchell R.
Barker and David C. Cundick
Attorneys for Defendant Maverik
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
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APPENDIX F
Industrial Commission's Order on Reconsideration

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600
CK Y ANN MCCORD,
Applicant,
•

VE:RIK

COUNTRY STORES,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
UADD No. 89-0031

*

*********************************

The request for reconsideration by the respondent in the
above entitled matter to review its Order Denying Review, issued on
February 28, 1992, having been duly considered under the authority
of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-13 (1953 as amended), the request for
reconsideration is denied for the following reasons:
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24,
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24,
1991.
Respondent requested
a formal hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10,
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and
September 10, 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order,
and could not therefore contest its provisions.
Maverik Country Stores first contends that the Commission has
erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-l(9) to make the filing of
Maverik's Petition for Review untimely, and to avoid exercise of
the Commissions discretion in extending any such deadline. This
section states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
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shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review,
(Emphasis added).
This statute allows a presiding officer to lengthen or shorten
a time period based upon good cause shown. Maverik did not ask the
Commission to lengthen its time period based on good cause shown,
nor did it show any good cause for doing so. As can be seen by its
clear strictures, it applies only to agency review, and not to
judicial reviejw as asserted by Maverik.
We therefore reject
Maverik's first issue.
Next, Maverik asks for a one day extension to petition for
review by the Commission. Again, this request must be rejected
based on failure of Maverik to show good cause.
Third, Maverik states that the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 was
not final since issues were specifically reserved in the order and
damages were not calculated.
Upon further review, we agree that
the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attorney fees was reserved by the following language:
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's fees award, pending
this Order, and shall address that in supplemental briefs to the Commission.
Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991).
Notwithstanding this concession, Maverik did not meet the
statutory deadline for filing a request for review of the final
order which addressed attorney fees issued on September 10, 1991 by
the ALJ. Again, Maverik has shown no good cause as to why the
Commission should extend the filing time.
Maverik also contends that the order could not have been final
because damages were not calculated. It cites Sloan v. Board of
Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989) for this proposition. We find
that the order of the ALJ was explicit enough to calculate damages
since Ms. McCord was awarded, among other provisions, reinstatement
to employment, and back pay, at the rates specified on page eight
of the ALJ order, from the date of unlawful termination until the
date of the ALJ order, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim
employment. Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). The offsets are
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listed on page eight of the order, and the date of termination,
among other findings of fact, are shown on pages two through five.
The monetary damages can thus be reasonably calculated.
The remaining allegations of error were addressed in the
Motion of Review of defendant dated October 15, 1991, and the
Commission again finds them nonmeritorius.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that
defendant is dismissed.

the

Request

for

Reconsideration

of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.

.^WV^^JLepneryjM. Haalev,

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Certified this (B^^day

^7?^i^U

1992 •
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vs.

;
|

Case Number: UADD 89-0031

MAVERIK COUNTY STORES,
Respondent,
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission
reconsider

its denial of Maverik 1 s request that the Commission

lengthen its time within which to file any motion for review by the
Commission of the Supplemental Order of the Administrative
Judge, which was issued on or about September

10, 1991.

Law
This

request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code, and is
limited to a request for review of the denial of an extension of
time.

I

The grounds for relief from the Order are:
1.

The procedural

events

in this matter to date are as

follows:
a.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued,

reserving attorney

fee issue for later determination, June 26,

1991.
b.

Supplemental

Order

awarding

approximately

$20,000

in

attorney fees and costs issued by the Administrative Law Judge,
September 10, 1991.
c.

Request for Review prepared and mailed October 10, 1991

but not received by the Commission until October 15, 1991 (the day
after Columbus Day).
d.

Industrial Commission issues Order Denying Review, finding

in part that Maverik f s Motion for Review was untimely, February 28,
1992.
e. Maverik files Request for Reconsideration, March 19, 1992,
including therein a Motion for an Extension of Time through August
15, 1992 for filing a Petition for Review.
f.

Commission

issues

Order

Denying

Request

for

Reconsideration, including denial of Maverik f s request that the
time period with in which to Request Review be extended, March 30,
1992.

2

2.

Good cause has been shown and is further shown herein (see

below) .

The good cause previously shown was the fact that the

document was prepared, executed and mailed on October 10, 1991,
which is the due date by statute.
3.

Section 63-46b-l(9), Utah Code, permits lengthening of any

time period for action by the Commission "for good cause shown".
4.

The Commission has, for the first time

in its Order

Denying Reconsideration, properly found that the original Order of
the Administrative Law Judge Church was not a final order.

See,

Order

This

Denying

Reconsideration, March

30, 1992, page

2.

changes the entire face of this case and justifies appropriate
review

of

all

the

matters

at

issue.

The

Commission

having

determined the initial order to be non-final, procedural matters
should be set aside for an initial determination on the merits of
the ALJ f s original order.
5.

Further good

cause for the extremely

short

extension

request that is shown as follows:
a.

Most of the "tardy" days are not chargeable to Maverik

under law.

They include October 12 and 13, weekends, as well as

October 14, Columbus Day.
b.

As pointed out in the Commission's Order Denying Review,

page 5 and 6,

there is little case authority construing what

constitutes "issuance11 by the Commission.
3

It is also far from

clear what constitutes "filing" with the Commission.

Because of

these ambiguities and because of the policy of the Commission of
avoiding hyper-formality, extensions should be freely granted when
requested in good faith.
c.

The Supplemental Order for which review was sought by

Maverik was received by counsel for Maverik on September 11 or 12,
1991, 28 or 29 days prior to the preparation and mailing of the
Petition for Review.
d.
and

At about the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental Order,

just

prior

to

Maverik*s

counsel

receiving

the

same,

the

undersigned, Mitchell R. Barker, was employed on an emergency basis
to defend a criminal defendant in a jury trial set to start (and
which did start) on September 16, 1991.

vs.

Stephen

Cartisano

and Challenger

The case was State

Foundation

II,

of

Utah

90-CR-47, Sixth

Circuit Court, Kane County.
e.

From prior to receipt of the Supplemental Order until

September 17, 1991, Mitchell R. Barker and David C. Cundick, who is
the other attorney who is handling this case and who appeared at
the

formal

hearing

in this matter with Mr. Barker, were

both

involved day and night in defense of Stephen Cartisano in that well
publicized trial which was held in Kanab, Utah.

Little time was

taken to eat or sleep, and there was no time to consider items
received in the mail.
4

f.

September

18, 1991, was the first day that Maverik's

counsel were back in the office, after the Cartisano trial ended in
a mistrial.

The Cartisano matter is scheduled to be heard again in

May 1992 after a change of venue to West Valley City.
g.

The undersigned

had another trial on October

3, 1991

before Judge Daniels in Third District Court, along with several
other in Court and out of Court matters during the period from
September 17, 1991 through October 10, 1991, the date Maverik's
Petition was due and the date it was prepared and mailed.

Those

included several days trying to catch up on office work after the
Cartisano.
h.

On the due date for the Petition, it was not ready and

hand delivered to the Industrial Commission before 5:00 because
virtually the entire day was spent researching and arguing before
Judge Mower of the Sixth Circuit Court in Kane County, on the issue
of Cartisanofs successful Motion to Change Venue from Kane County
to Salt Lake County.
6.

Under Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code, it appears that on the

due date for intra-agency review a request may be mailed rather
than hand filed.

That section states that the request shall "state

the date upon which it was mailed" and "be sent by mail to the
presiding officer and to each party".
1(9), Utah Code.
5

See also Section 63-46b-

7.

This is not a repeat of the prior motion to reconsider, or

a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to reconsider.

An

enlargement of time was first requested on March 19 of this year,
and was denied for the only time on March 30, 1992.
Wherefore, good cause has previously been shown and is here
further shown for the very short extension sought be Maverik to
make its Petition for Review of the Supplemental Order timely,
despite the fact that it was mailed on the due date and received
shortly thereafter by the Commission.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 1992.
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